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Abstract 
Recent work suggests that ethnic minority wage differentials in Canada are 
smaller among those receiving performance pay and that the returns to perfor-
mance pay are larger for ethnic minorities. This article adds to these findings. 
First, it demonstrates critical gender differences. The earlier findings are gen-
erated almost exclusively by males, as we show that the minority wage differ-
ential is small or zero for women in both the time rate sector and the 
performance pay sector. Second, accounting for immigration and language 
tends to move the ethnic wage differential in favour of minorities. Minority 
women on output pay are shown to earn more than non-minority women. While 
the differential often remains negative for minority men on time rates, it 
becomes insignificant in our most narrow comparison. 
1. Introduction 
New immigration patterns and the growing diversity of the Canadian popu-
lation have generated important policy debates. At the heart of these debates 
are questions over the extent to which public and private institutions have 
responded to the changing face of Canadian society. Nowhere are these 
questions more apparent than in the significant barriers faced by visible 
minority groups in the labour market (Bloom et al. 1995; Statistics Canada 
2003a). Indeed, a recent study by the Conference Board of Canada finds that 
visible minorities earn 14.5 per cent less than other Canadians (Conference 
Board of Canada 2004). This difference raises serious issues regarding con-
stitutional rights, obstacles to economic growth and the concentration of 
social problems such as poverty, unemployment and social alienation. This 
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article employs Statistics Canada's Workplace and Employee Survey (WES) 
to examine the impact of ethnicity on earnings after accounting for the 
method of pay, minority language and immigrant status. 
Fang and Heywood (2006) first examined the association between 
payment method and ethnic wage differentials among non-union workers 
in Canada. Building on earlier research, they hypothesize that output pay 
tying earnings to productivity makes it harder for employers to discrimi-
nate in earnings. Their estimates from the 1999 WES confirm that ethnic 
minorities earn significantly less than non-minorities in the time rate sector, 
but receive essentially identical earnings in the output pay sector. While 
their Canadian evidence confirms similar findings from other countries 
(reviewed in the next section), it does not account for the particularly high 
correlations in Canada between immigrant status, language skills and 
ethnicity. Neither does it do justice to distinctions that appear on the basis 
of gender (Geddes and Heywood 2003). 
In this re-examination of non-union workers in Canada, we demonstrate 
that the reported relationship is largely absent for females. Female ethnic 
minorities suffer little or no discrimination in either the time rates or perfor-
mance pay sectors. This reflects the associated fact that the gender earnings 
gap among ethnic minorities is small or zero as opposed to the large gender 
earnings gap among non-minorities. Moreover, incorporating immigration 
and language as earnings determinants tends to move ethnic wage differen-
tials in favour of minorities. After this incorporation, the ethnic wage differ-
ential among women receiving performance pay moves modestly positive. 
While often remaining negative, the ethnic wage differential among men 
moves to zero in our most narrow comparison of occupations. Together, 
these examinations go towards determining the importance of ethnicity in 
the Canadian labour market and provide evidence on the role of payment 
method as a force that may limit discretionary wage setting and so influence 
ethnic earnings patterns. 
2. Theory and past evidence 
Discrimination and Method of Pay 
According to Becker (1971), the extent of discrimination reflects the intensity 
of prejudice on the one hand and the cost of discrimination on the other. 
Payment structures linked to individual output may increase the cost of 
discrimination, thereby reducing its extent (Heywood and O'Halloran 2005). 
Contrast two methods of setting pay. In the first, supervisors evaluate 
performance by judging effort or input (Lazear 1986), a process that allows 
a supervisor's prejudice to be translated into differences in evaluations and 
then into differences in earnings. Bureaucratic rules (Prendergast and Topel 
1996) or concern over reputation (Baker et al. 1994) may restrict this trans-
lation but are unlikely to eliminate it. Indeed, Elvira and Town (2001) 
show that race influences supervisors' performance evaluations. In the 
United States, a white supervisor of both white and non-white subordinates 
typically gives the white a better rating than the non-white even after con-
trolling for productivity (an objective measure of output) and demographic 
variables. 
In the second extreme, output determines pay. The supervisor knows 
individual worker outputs and has a pre-established wage increment for each 
unit of output. Racial prejudice becomes harder to translate into differential 
earnings. The objective evidence increases external transparency and may 
create a cognitive barrier. Legal authorities judging the earnings structure are 
more likely to be concerned about racial earnings discrepancies between 
workers with identical measured productivity. Thus, the improved informa-
tion on productivity generated by output-based pay increases the expected 
cost of discrimination by increasing the probability of detection and of the 
associated penalties. 1 
We recognize that output-based pay will not always eliminate the realm for 
racial and ethnicity preferences. First, output-based pay schemes often retain 
discretionary decisions that can influence pay such as assignment of a sales 
territory. Second, even if ethnicity plays no role in these assignments, there 
remains ex post discretion. Every piece counted must meet a quality standard, 
a standard that may allow supervisors scope for judgment. Nonetheless, 
the reduced scope for judgment and the more nearly objective productivity 
measures associated with output-based pay increase the cost of allowing 
prejudice to become differential treatment by race. 
Several past studies test the association between discrimination and 
payment method. Gunderson (1975) uses Canadian establishment data, 
showing that the average gender wage difference within occupations across 
establishments is smaller when they use incentive pay systems. lirjahn and 
Stephan (2004) find smaller gender wage differentials in Germany among 
those paid piece rates rather than hourly wages. In the United States, racial 
differentials are smaller in those industries with greater use of performance 
pay (Belman and Heywood 1988). On the other hand, Bronars and Moore 
(1995) find no role for payment methods using the 1988 to 1990 waves of 
the National Longitudinal Study of Youth (NLSY). Yet, Heywood and 
O'Halloran (2005) use the more recent waves of the NLSY (1996-2000), 
showing that non-white men paid time rates have earnings more than 8 per 
cent lower than white men paid time rates. Using the same specification, there 
are no racial differences in earnings among those men receiving output pay. 
Moreover, the premium associated with receiving output pay is twice as large 
for non-whites as for whites.2 
Fang and Heywood (2006) use the 1999 WES to examine the determinants 
of the ethnic wage differential in Canada. They construct a 'non-European' 
ethnicity category and show that non-Europeans in Canada paid by time 
rates receive 6 per cent lower earnings than European Canadians, all else 
equal. Yet, non-European Canadians paid by output pay receive identical 
earnings to their European Canadian counterparts. While this result fits with 
much of the literature, it fails to fully explore the potential for differences by 
gender or to account for the particularly strong correlations between immi-
grant status, minority language usage and ethnicity. 
Indeed, comparisons of the 2001 and 1991 Census from Statistics Canada 
indicate that nearly 80 per cent of immigrants to Canada over that period are 
non-Europeans (Statistics Canada 2003b). In our sample selected from the 
WES, the simple correlations between non-European and immigration status 
is 0.57, and between non-European and minority language is 0.48 (that 
between minority language and immigration status is 0.58). These high cor-
relations raise the possibility that the ethnic differential may simply reflect 
omitted variable bias and may not be the result of ethnic status, but instead 
be a function of immigration status or language. 
Immigration, Language and Earnings 
Increasingly, research focuses on the impact of the complex mixture of 
language, ethnic origins and immigrant status on individuals' social and 
economic status (Chiswick 1991, 1992; Christofides and Swidinsky 1997; 
Pendakur and Pendakur 1998, 2002). Lazear (1995) developed a formal 
model of language as human capital in which language acquisition increases 
individuals' trade and consumption opportunities. Increased knowledge in 
common language expands capacity for individuals to trade with a wider 
range of people. On the other hand, the costs of learning a language include 
the sacrifice in time, money and effort, which may result in less labour market 
experience or educational attainment as compared with unilinguals. This 
human capital theory of language has some testable implications. Since the 
labour market benefits of language are due to an increase in opportunities to 
gain from trade, the magnitUde of such opportunities should be correlated 
with the number of people with whom the individual could speak in the same 
workplace or in the same community. Thus, at the margin, additional lan-
guage knowledge should be associated with higher returns. 
Yet minority language knowledge can present a barrier for two reasons. 
Lang (1986, 1993) suggests that language differences impose transaction 
costs on work interactions. One response to this transaction cost is to not hire 
minorities or hire them at a lower wage (Chiswick 1992; Davila et al. 1993; 
Dustmann 1994; Kossoudji 1988; Stolzenberg and Tienda 1997; Tienda and 
Neidert 1984). This can lead to segregation and wage differentials in a 
competitive market, as people try to minimize inter-group communication. 
He further asserts that minority language knowledge may act as a mark for 
economic discrimination and lower earnings as it identifies to employers 
differences and deep affiliation with an ethnic or cultural community and 
identity. 
Hellerstein and Neumark (2002, 2005, 2008) emphasize the advantages of 
employer-employee linked data to study labour market discrimination, since 
most discriminatory workplace policies and practices occur at the establish-
ment level. In addition to providing tests of discrimination, matched 
employer-employee data have proven useful in measuring labour market 
segregation and assessing its consequences. Their empirical results show 
considerable segregation by Hispanic ethnicity and by English language pro-
ficiency. Hispanic workers, but not white workers, suffer wage penalties from 
employment in a workplace with a large share of Hispanic workers, and even 
more so with a large share of Hispanic workers with poor English. 
Using matched employee-employer data from the 1999 WES, Drolet 
(2002) demonstrates that the inclusion of workplace characteristics and 
practices and more accurate industry measures dramatically increases the 
'explained' component of gender wage gap to nearly 60 per cent. Almost 43 
per cent of the pay gap can be explained by workplace characteristics. Work-
place practices alone (including receipt of performance-based pay, participa-
tion in self-directed workgroups, overtime pay, training expenditures per 
employee, workplace part-time rate) explain 23.5 per cent of the male-female 
pay gap. 
In total, these studies show how various individual and workplace 
characteristics, including the concentration of immigrants, whether minority 
status is visible and the use of minority language can have an influence on 
gender or ethnic wage differentials. However, information about workplace 
characteristics and practices is typically not available in the census data or 
major household survey data in Canada, such as the Labour Market Activity 
Surveyor the Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics. 
The Interaction of Gender and Minority Differentials 
Past work on the relationship between performance pay and minority wage 
differentials has not placed emphasis on the role of gender. The examination 
by Heywood and O'Halloran for the United States examines only males. The 
earlier Canadian examination by Fang and Heywood combines the genders 
and presents only a single parsimonious estimate that divides the sample by 
gender. This lack of emphasis should be reconsidered, given the substantial 
evidence that North American minority wage differentials differ dramatically 
by gender. This was noted by Cain (1986) and remains pronounced with 
Bayard et al. (1999) putting the US black-white wage differential for men at 
-0.121 log wages for men but at only -0.022 log wages for women. Among 
the hypotheses suggested to explain this larger difference are differences in 
the intensity of prejudice, differences in the degree of labour force attach-
ment, with minority women having greater attachment relative to non-
minority women than do minority men relative to non-minority men, and 
that the degree of ethnic segregation is far smaller among women than among 
men (see Bayard et al. 1999; Hellerstein and Neumark 2008). 
The presence of such contrasting ethnic wage differences by gender sug-
gests that patterns associated with performance pay for men or for the entire 
workforce may not hold for women. In particular, if the minority wage 
differential is already small or near zero for women, the difference between 
performance pay and time rates may be anticipated to make little or no 
difference. 
3. Data and variables 
We draw data from the 1999 Canadian WES. The WES is linked data 
consisting of both employer and employee components. Employers are 
sampled by physical location, and employees are then sampled within each 
location. The survey excludes business locations in the Yukon, Nunavut and 
the Northwest Territories, as well as agriculture, fishing, road, bridge and 
highway maintenance, government services, and religious organizations. The 
initial wave of the WES was first conducted during the summer and fall of 
1999. Responses were received from 6,322 business locations and 23,540 
employees, with response rates as high as 95.2 per cent for employers and 
82.8 per cent for employees. 
The survey contains detailed demographic and labour market information 
on individual workers, and also information on workplace characteristics, 
business strategy and human resource practices. It allows us to identify 
whether respondents are immigrants and of what vintage. It identifies 
whether the respondent uses a foreign language (a language other than 
English or French) as their primary language at home, and also identifies the 
respondent's ethnic background. Following previous evidence from Canada, 
we break down the simple immigration dummies to indicate the decade 
(1970s, 1980s or 1990s) in which the immigrant arrived.3 Our expectation is 
that more recent immigrants will tend to have lower earnings. Recent immi-
grants may be more likely to lack skills and abilities specific to the Canadian 
labour market, as they acquire these skills over time. Alternatively, the most 
recent cohort may have lower earnings potential compared with earlier 
cohorts. Nonetheless, both recent immigrant status and use of a foreign 
language at home stand, in part, as measures of human capital that should be 
held constant so as to isolate the true influence of ethnicity. 
The WES also includes information on education, actual reported full-time 
years of experience, employee union/collective bargaining agreement cover-
age, marital status, whether or not the worker has received training (either 
on-the-job or classroom) over the last year, and workplace size. With rich 
regional and industry controls, the WES allows testing the hypothesis that 
payment methods influence ethnic wage differentials after accounting for 
immigration and language. Note that we largely focus the examination on the 
non-union sector. This decision follows from Fang and Heywood (2006), and 
recognizes the small extent of performance pay in the union sector and our 
inability to identify a return to performance pay in the union sector. 
The earnings data indicate whether or not they originate from wages or 
salary, piece rates, tips, commissions, profit sharing or bonuses. As with 
many data sources, the actual amounts of earnings attributable to these 
sources are not available, but it is common for workers receiving output pay 
to also receive a base time rate. In identifying output pay, we begin with 
a broad definition that includes piece rates, tips, commissions and bonuses. 
We follow that with a narrower definition suggested by Parent (1999) and 
Heywood and O'Halloran (2005) that combines piece rates, tips and 
commissions into a single measure, but recognizes bonuses as a more discre-
tionary form of payment and includes it in the base with time rates. In a third 
step, this narrow definition of performance pay requires us to think about 
the appropriate set of occupations upon which to perform our estimations. 
Output pay is concentrated among sales, technical and production workers, 
and is less common among managers, professionals and clerical workers.4 
Despite a substantial loss in sample size, we limit the sample to the first three 
occupational groups in our third set of estimations.5 
In our analysis, we use a single combined 'Non-European' indicator to 
identify workers whose parents or grandparents did not descend from one or 
more of four ethnic groups: (i) Canadian, (ii) British, (iii) French, and (iv) 
other European. Thus, we combine the more than one dozen categories for 
Blacks, Chinese, Southeast Asians, Natives and other non-Europeans into 
a singe category in an attempt to strike a balance between detailed ethnic 
indicators and a reasonable sample size for the minority group. We do, 
however, discuss robustness checks that suggest our findings are not driven 
by any single ethnic minority. Unfortunately, we do not have workplace level 
data on ethnic composition, but we recognize that such data could be used 
to more directly investigate issues of segregation and dominate individual 
measures of ethnicity. 
The wages of workers reported as other than hourly are converted into an 
hourly rate based on total compensation and total hours of work. This 
convention allows inclusion of those paid on a salary basis. Reflecting the 
survey design, we make no assumptions about particular observations being 
outliers and do not trim the dataset. Whenever reported earnings are above 
or below cut-offs determined by an imputation process, the survey managers 
directly confirmed the earnings data with the respondent.6 
The descriptive statistics by payment method are presented in Table 1 and 
a more complete breakdown by both gender and payment method is pre-
sented in Appendix Table AI. A full list of detailed variable definitions is 
available upon request from the authors. The mean wages in Table 1 show 
that among our Canadian non-union sample using the broader definition of 
output pay (bonus included), the mean wages of those on output pay are 25.8 
per cent more ($20.62 vs $16.39). At the same time, non-Europeans earn 3.5 
per cent less than Europeans ($17.24 vs $17.84). When divided by sector, 
non-European workers earn more on average when receiving output pay 
($21.04 vs $15.41), while Europeans also earn more but the gap is not as large 
($20.55 vs $16.55). Put differently, on average, non-Europeans earn 2.4 per 
cent more than European Canadians when receiving output pay, but 7.4 per 
cent less than European Canadians when paid time rates. These raw averages 
hint at lower or even positive ethnic earnings differentials in the performance 
pay sector, but obviously they do not adjust for other relevant earnings 
determinants. Table Al provides the descriptive statistics divided by both 
gender and the receipt of output pay. 
To determine the impact of payment methods, immigration status and 
minority language on potential ethnic wage differentials, we estimate wage 
TABLE 1 
Weighted Means by Payment Scheme (Based on Non-Union Sample and the Broad Definition of Output Pay) 
Variable 
Hourly wage 
(Non-immigrants and immigrants who arrived before 1970s) 
Immigrants who arrived in the 1970s 
Immigrants who arrived in the 1980s 
Immigrants who arrived in the 1990s 
Non-Europeans 
Foreign language at home 
Female 
Age in years 
Married (1 if married, 0 otherwise) 
Years of education 
Dependent children 
Presence of young children 
Part time 
Supervision (supervision of other employees' work on a day-to-day basis) 
Member of a team (1 if yes, 0 if no) 
Years of experience 
Job tenure in years 
Months of unemployment in the past five years 
Working at home (hours worked at home in a usual week) 
Training received (1 if yes, 0 if no) 
Workplace size (log of total establishment employment) 
Observations 
Output pay 
(means) 
20.62 
0.867 
0.052 
0.045 
0.035 
0.136 
0.071 
0.512 
37.83 
0.590 
13.94 
0.437 
0.202 
0.113 
0.481 
0.567 
15.50 
7.45 
1.09 
1.82 
0.603 
3.79 
5,607 
Output pay Time rate 
(s.d.) (means) 
13.58 16.39 
0.340 0.866 
0.223 0.043 
0.208 0.044 
0.184 0.046 
0.343 0.144 
0.257 0.083 
0.500 0.539 
10.51 39.27 
0.492 0.546 
2.27 13.58 
0.496 0.418 
0.402 0.181 
0.316 0.167 
0.500 0.405 
0.496 0.424 
10.13 15.76 
7.45 6.93 
3.80 1.44 
4.48 1.40 
0.489 0.492 
1.72 3.56 
5,607 10,699 
Time rate 
(s.d.) 
9.94 
0.341 
0.204 
0.205 
0.211 
0.352 
0.276 
0.499 
11.65 
0.498 
2.42 
0.493 
0.385 
0.373 
0.491 
0.494 
10.96 
7.26 
4.87 
4.14 
0.500 
1.90 
10,699 
Notes: Output pay includes piece rates, commissions, tips and bonuses. Also included are dummy variables identifying 6 occupations, 6 regions and 14 industries. 
Means are available from the authors. s.d. = standard deviation. 
functions from various sub-samples of the WES. We use survey regression 
methods and employee survey weights provided by the WES identifying the 
primary survey units as the establishments from which multiple workers may 
be interviewed.7 The resulting estimation is designed to return representative 
results and to provide heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. These 
errors correct for the common components associated with a cluster of 
workers from a given workplace (for more on when to use heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors, see Stock and Watson 2003: 596-7). 
4. Results 
Table 2 shows earnings equations estimated separately within the samples 
of ethnic minorities and of non-minorities. These estimates make a series of 
points that begin our inquiry. First, among ethnic minorities in Canada, 
women do not seem disadvantaged in our base estimate that controls 
for performance pay. This result persists even when performance pay is 
removed as a control. Second, the estimates support the point from past 
research that the influence of performance pay is larger among ethnic 
minorities. Further, the addition of the immigration and language variables 
influences the ethnic minorities more than the non-minorities, as would be 
expected, but they do not change either the return to performance payor 
the estimated gender differentials. It remains the case that among non-
minorities, women suffer a double-digit percentage wage penalty, but that 
among minorities, the penalty is very small and insignificantly different 
from zero. Among the minorities, recent immigrants and those using a 
foreign language at home earn less. 
With these points taken, we now examine the core question of how the 
ethnic earnings gap varies between those receiving output pay and those 
receiving time rates. Table 3 summarizes the results and shows that among 
women receiving time rates, there exists no ethnic earnings gap. Thus, the 
earlier finding that the ethnic earnings gap exists in the time rate sector but 
not the performance pay sector is not driven by women but exclusively by 
men. Among men, ethnic minorities suffer significantly lower earnings, 0.14 
log wages lower, than non-minorities. Adding the immigration and language 
controls appears associated with a decline in this differential, but it remains 
statistically significant. 
These results can be contrasted with those in the output pay sector (again 
using the broadest definition) as shown in Table 3. The initial estimates in 
columns 1 and 3 show neither gender with a significant ethnic differential, 
and the results broadly mirror those presented by Fang and Heywood (2006). 
Again, the controls for immigration and language add little to the male 
estimations. Among women, the immigration and language controls emerge 
as important, with both being associated with reduced earnings. The fact that 
the most recent immigrant cohort is strongly associated with reduced earn-
ings could reflect either that immigrants assimilate over time and the penalty 
TABLE 2 
Estimated Gender Wage Gap and Return to Output Pay (Broad Definition) by Ethnicity: Based on Non-Union Sample 
N on-Europeans Europeans 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Female -0.017 (-0.51) -0.035 (-1.09) -0.037 (-1.16) -0.129*** (-7.97) -0.130*** (-8.03) -0.130*** (-8.05) 
Output pay 0.157*** (4.76) 0.147*** (4.52) 0.152*** (4.79) 0.115*** (7.25) 0.115*** (7.22) 0.116*** (7.26) 
(Non-immigrants or immigrants who 
arrived before 1970s) 
Immigrants who arrived in the 1970s -0.015 (-0.37) 0.0005 (0.01) 0.058 (1.59) 0.054 (1.47) 
Immigrants who arrived in the 1980s -0.085** (-2.09) -0.045 (-1.08) -0.051 (-0.97) -0.060 (-1.13) 
Immigrants who arrived in the 1990s -0.197*** (-4.88) -0.153*** (-3.65) -0.015 (-0.24) -0.034 (-0.54) 
Foreign language at home -0.080** (-2.31) -0.044 (-1.05) 
Observations 1,982 1,982 1,982 14,324 14,324 14,324 
R2 0.562 0.579 0.583 0.533 0.533 0.533 
Notes: Models also include occupations (six categories), regions (six categories), and industries (14 categories). Absolute values of t-statistics based on robust 
standard errors are in parentheses. 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
TABLE 3 
Estimated Ethnic Wage Gap by Output Pay (Broad Definition) and by Gender: Based on the Non-Union Sample 
Output pay Time rates 
Men Women Men Women 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Non-Europeans 
-0.028 (-0.61) 
-0.012 (-0.30) 0.020 (0.47) 0.128*** (2.68) 
-0.140*** (-3.44) 
-0.091** (-2.20) 
-0.031 (-0.99) 
-0.004 (-0.09) (Non-immigrants or 
immigrants who arrived 
before 1970s) 
Immigrants in the 1970s 0.057 (1.08) 
-0.045 (-0.79) 0.082 (1.64) 0.047 (0.92) Immigrants in the 1980s 
-0.070 (-0.89) 
-0.032 (-0.49) 
-0.043 (-0.70) 
-0.006 (-0.11) Immigrants in the 1990s 
-0.073 (-1.34) 
-0.171** (-2.21) 0.009 (0.16) 
-0.219*** (-4.04) Foreiglllanguage 0.021 (0.40) 
-0.169*** (-2.81) 
-0.053 (-1.28) 0.035 (0.81) Age 0.050*** (5.22) 0.051 *** (5.20) 0.048*** (4.55) 0.048*** (4.66) 0.027*** (3.84) 0.027*** (3.88) 0.022*** (3.64) 0.023*** (3.80) Age squared 
-0.001 *** (-5.23) 
-0.001*** (-5.28) 
-0.001 *** (-4.41) 
-0.001*** (4.50) 
-0.0003 .... * (-3.85) 
-0.0003 ...... (-3.91) 
-0.0003*** (-3.59) 
-0.0002*** (-3.74) Married 0.033 (1.12) 0.034 (1.13) 0.098"** (2.85) 0.111 (3.22) 0.075*** (2.82) 0.077*** (2.91) 0.076*** (3.38) 0.080*** (3.58) Years of education 0.019** (2.49) 0.019** (2.52) 0.045*** (5.00) 0.046*** (5.15) 0.028*** (5.46) 0.028*** (5.45) 0.029*** (5.75) 0.029*** (5.86) Years of experience 0.003 (0.92) 0.003 (0.83) 0.008** (2.67) 0.007** (2.43) 0.006"'** (2.91) 0.006*** (2.81) 0.002** (2.08) 0.002* (1.95) Job tenure 0.007*** (3.27) 0.007"'** (3.27) 0.004 (1.30) 0.003 (1.23) 0.006*** (3.43) 0.006*** (3.38) 0.011 *** (7.29) 0.011 *** (6.81) Supervisor 0.090*** (3.31) 0.092*** (3.39) 0.042 (1.12) 0.039 (1.06) 0.072*** (2.94) 0.072"*" (2.93) 0.017 (0.082) 0.018 (0.86) Workplace size 0.071 *** (6.87) 0.071 *** (6.87) 0.035*** (3.27) 0.036*** (3.31) 0.050*** (6.89) 0.050*** (6.86) 0.043*"* (8.06) 0.044*** (8.12) Months unemployed 
-0.006* (-1.81) 
-0.007* (-1.83) 0.003 (1.01) 0.004 (1.39) 
-0.005*" (-1.97) 
-0.005** (-2.02) 
-0.002 (-0.96) 
-0.003 (-1.17) Work hours at home 0.007* (1.66) 0.007* (1.69) 0.0 11 ** (2.49) 0.011 *** (2.69) 0.005 (1.34) 0.005 (1.36) 0.006* (1.70) 0.006 (1.61) Training received 0.021 (0.65) 0.020 (0.65) 0.086*** (2.84) 0.085*** (2.81) 0.045* (1.89) 0.044* (1.85) 0.017 (0.86) 0.020 (1.00) Dependent children 
-0.025 (-0.57) 
-0.024 (-0.54) 
-0.137*** (-3.14) 
-0.134*** (-3.13) 0.024 (0.75) 0.025 (0.80) 
-0.041 (-1.50) 
-0.041 (-1.52) Young children 0.037 (0.99) 0.038 (1.02) 0.058 (1.27) 0.061 (1.35) 0.074** (1.97) 0.073* (1.95) 0.083*"'* (2.81) 0.087*** (3.00) Part time 
-0.011 (-0.14) 
-0.011 (-0.13) 0.093** (2.03) 0.094"'* (2.05) 
-0.0005 (-0.01) 
-0.002 (-0.05) 0.053** (2.05) 0.048* (1.89) Constant 1.531*** (7.05) 1.516*** (6.88) 1.197*** (5.49) 1.156*** (5.39) 1.649*** (9.35) 1.633*** (9.12) 1.807**" (12.57) 1.787 (12.60) R2 0.511 0.512 0.532 0.542 0.471 0.473 0.513 0.520 N 3,247 3,247 2,360 2,360 5,714 5,714 4,985 4,985 
Notes: Models also include occupatiollS (six categories), regions (six categories), and industries (14 categories). Absolute values of t-statistics based on robust standard errors are in parentheses . 
.. Significant at 10"10; ** significant at 5%; *"'* significant at 1%. 
vanishes, or that the recent cohort is of lower productivity. In our cross-
sectional data, we cannot distinguish between these two interpretations. 
Importantly, the high correlation between ethnicity and the immigration and 
language variables alters the estimated ethnic wage differential. In the final 
estimation in column 4, minority women earn significantly more than non-
minority women. 
At least from the point of view of internal consistency, this paradoxical 
result for women might have been expected. We saw earlier that among 
minorities, there was no gender wage differential (Table 2). Moreover, we 
saw that minorities earned more from being on output pay than did non-
minorities. Thus, holding constant the strong associations between minority 
status and immigration, and between minority status and language, we 
observe minority women on output pay earning more than non-minority 
women. One possibility is that there is stronger positive selection by minority 
women than non-minority women into jobs paying output-related pay. 
Those minority women with the greatest ability (much of it unmeasured in 
our variables) may be more likely to enter the performance pay sector. As an 
illustration, it might be that their lack of detailed cultural knowledge is less of 
a detriment in this sector than would be true for men. Alternatively, this 
gender difference may reflect detailed gender segregation by jobs that we are 
not capturing. 
To explore the robustness of our findings, we repeat the exercise with the 
narrower definition of performance pay that classifies bonuses as part of 
the base. The point estimates change, but the pattern established in Table 3 
does not. As Table 4 shows, only men paid time rates emerge with a nega-
tive ethnic earnings differential, as minority and non-minority women on 
time rates earn essentially the same. The initial estimates in columns 1 and 
3 of Table 4 show neither gender with a significant ethnicity differential 
among those receiving the narrow definition of output pay. Again, it is 
women on output pay that seem to be most influenced by immigration 
and language indicators, and after holding these constant, there continues 
to be evidence that among women receiving output pay, minorities earn 
more. 
Finally, we limit our sample to those three broad occupations in which 
workers are most likely to encounter both time rates and output pay. As 
Table 5 shows, the initial evidence before adding the immigration and lan-
guage controls looks similar with a negative earnings differential for minority 
men on time rates but not for those in the performance pay sector. The 
addition of the immigration and language variables again indicate a signifi-
cant positive coefficient for minority women in the output sector. The notable 
difference within this sample is for the men on time rates. The inclusion of the 
language and immigration variables causes the male minority differential to 
vanish for the first time. Thus, in this narrow sample, we find no evidence in 
either sector that ethnic minorities in Canada are underpaid given their 
immigration status and language usage. There remains evidence that 
language and immigration status are determinants of earnings, and while 
TABLE 4 
Estimated Ethnic Wage Gap by Output Pay (Narrow Definition) and by Gender: Based on the Non-Union Sample 
Output pay Time rates 
Men Women Men Women 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
N on-Europeans 0.046 (0.67) 0.083 (0.85) -0.059 (-0.44) 0.282** (2.19) -0.090*** (-3.18) -0.069** (-2.12) -0.012 (-0.44) 0.017 (0.51) 
(Non-immigrants or 
immigrants who 
arrived before 
1970s) 
Immigrants who -0.168 (-1.61) -0.385** (-2.56) 0.071 * (1.75) 0.051 (1.36) 
arrived in the 
1970s 
Immigrants who -0.052 (-0.45) -0.185 (-1.55) -0.050 (-0.91) -0.015 (-0.31) 
arrived in the 
1980s 
Immigrants who 0.044 (0.36) -0.356* (-1.84) -0.039 (-0.87) -0.201 *** (-4.04) 
arrived in the 
1990s 
Foreign language -0.032 (-0.35) -0.342** (-2.01) -0.030 (-0.75) 0.009 (0.21) 
at home 
R2 638 638 468 468 8,323 8,323 6,877 6,877 
N 0.632 0.635 0.507 0.544 0.490 0.492 0.522 0.527 
Notes: Models have included occupations (six categories), regions (six categories), industries (14 categories) and all other explanatory variables shown in Table 3. 
t-statistics based on robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
TABLE 5 
Estimated Ethnic Wage Gap by Output Pay (Narrow Definition) and by Gender: Based on Limited Non-Union Sample 
Output pay Time rates 
Men Women Men Women 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Non-Europeans 0.056 (0.73) -0.015 (-0.16) 0.045 (0.31) 0.345** (2.10) -0.062* (-1.67) 0.004 (0.08) -0.059 (-1.51) -0.015 (-0.35) 
(Non-immigrants or 
immigrants who 
arrived before 
1970s) 
Immigrants who -0.203 (-1.49) -0.200 (-1.02) 0.010 (0.17) 0.043 (0.68) 
arrived in the 
1970s 
Immigrants who 0.135 (0.83) -0.128 (-0.74) -0.071 (-0.86) 0.020 (0.27) 
arrived in the 
1980s 
Immigrants who 0.206 (1.25) 0.058 (0.19) 0.046 (0.64) -0.215*** (-3.12) 
arrived in the 
1990s 
Foreign language 0.023 (0.17) -0.501 *** (-2.41) -0.162*** (-2.97) -0.016 (-0.31) 
at home 
R2 0.640 0.646 0.495 0.532 0.400 0.408 0.409 0.419 
N 318 318 238 238 3,485 3,485 2,144 2,144 
Notes: Models have included occupations (three categories), regions (six categories), industries (14 categories) and all other explanatory variables shown in 
Table 3. t-statistics based on robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
broadly consistent with evidence that there is convergence between the earn-
ings of immigrants and non-immigrants over time, our data does not allow us 
to confirm this. 
Robustness Checks 
We have undertaken a series of robustness checks that largely reinforce the 
findings shown. While we do not present tables of results for all of these, we 
emphasize that they are available from the authors. First, we divided the 
ethnic minority variable into four categories: black, Asian, native and other 
non-European. In the regression equivalents to columns 5-8 in Table 4, the 
coefficients on both Asian and other non-Europeans emerge as negative 
and significant for males in the time rate sector, but not for women. In the 
equivalent of Table 5, there are no significant coefficients. 
Given the relatively high simple correlations between immigration status, 
ethnicity and foreign language use, the influence of multi-collinearity on the 
estimates in columns 2, 4,6 and 8 is an obvious concern. As a diagnostic tool, 
we calculate the variance inflation factors (VIFs) for each of the critical 
variables. The VIFs identify how much the variance of the coefficient esti-
mate is being inflated by multi-collinearity. Specifically, the square root of the 
VIFs is how much larger the standard error is when compared with what it 
would be if the variable was uncorrelated with the other regressors in the 
equation (see Allison 1999). We calculated VIFs for many of the specifica-
tions, and the largest VIFs among the ethnicity, language and immigration 
variables reached only 2.2 for foreign language. Values this low generally 
suggest that multi-collinearity is not obscuring general patterns (a typical 
rule-of-thumb for severe multi-collinearity requires VIFs of 10 or greater). 
There may be differences both in the occupations in the two sectors and in 
the extent of gender sorting. We calculated gender segregation indices sepa-
rately for the time rate and output pay sectors across the 24 underlying 
occupational classifications within our already limited sample. The indices 
identify the share of workers of one gender that would need to change 
occupations in order to create identical distributions across occupations for 
men and women. In the time rate sector, the index takes a value of 54.0, while 
in the output pay sector it is only 41.0. Thus, the gender distribution of 
occupations is more nearly similar in the output pay sector. This results 
because of more similar concentrations in wholesale, technical and real estate 
sales and in several of the trade occupations. 8 
We have largely limited our investigation to the non-union sector due to 
the relative absence of both performance pay and a performance pay influ-
ence on earnings in the unionized sector. Nonetheless, there may be interest 
in the earnings differentials by minority, language and gender status in the 
unionized sector given the preponderance of time rates. In specifications that 
mimic the more complete specification in Table 3, we find no significant 
wage differential associated with non-European minorities for either men or 
women in either the output payor time rate sectors. Foreign language is 
associated with significantly lower earnings for both genders in the output 
pay sector, and immigration status emerges with one or more significant 
negative coefficients for both genders in the time rate sector and for men in 
the output pay sector. 
We recognize the fact that we have mUltiple observations from some 
establishments (although because there remain more than 4,000 (4,259) 
underlying establishments, many do not have multiple observations). This 
allows us to control for fixed effects for the establishment in those cases in 
which multiple observations exist, and re-estimate the regressions in an 
unbalanced panel. These results do not substantially alter the patterns we 
have shown. In reproducing Tables 3, 4 and 5, each shows a significant 
positive coefficient for non-European women in the output pay sector. More-
over, estimates for the broader sample (shown in Table 6 and analogous to 
Table 4) indicate a significant negative coefficient for non-European males in 
time rates. In unreported fixed effects estimates of the complete specification 
using the narrow sample (analogous to Table 5), the pattern in Table 5 of no 
significant differences for non-European males in either sector is replicated. 
Thus, although there are necessary differences in coefficients and levels of 
significance, the broad pattern we outline is replicated. 
Finally, while our discussion has implicitly recognized that the choice of 
sector may be endogenous, we have not attempted to model that process. The 
underlying choice structure includes a firm choice to offer output pay, the 
worker choice to seek employment at such an employer and the employer's 
decision to hire particular workers among those seeking employment in their 
sector. While this structure may make it difficult to find suitable instruments, 
it is worth thinking a minute about the worker choice aspect. If there are 
unmeasured factors (such as ability) that are associated both with earnings 
and worker choice of sector, it is possible that returns to output pay will be 
biased. Moreover, if the nature of those factors differs between European and 
non-European workers, it is conceivable that the differences we identify by 
sector and minority status are also misleading. We necessarily leave this for 
future work. 
5. Conclusions 
This article explores the sensitivity of measures of ethnic earnings differen-
tials to separate estimation by gender and to the inclusion of controls for 
immigration and foreign language use. This exploration modifies what is 
known about the relationship between output pay and minority earnings 
differentials in Canada. There appears to be no gender earnings differentials 
among ethnic minorities. Related to this, there is no evidence of a negative 
ethnic earnings differential among women in either the time rate or output 
pay rate. Indeed, after accounting for immigration and language, the evi-
dence is that female ethnic minorities earn more than non-minority women in 
the output pay sector. We speculate this may reflect greater positive selection 
by minority women, but this remains only a hypothesis. 
TABLE 6 
Fixed-effects Estimates of Ethnic Wage Gap by Output Pay (Narrow Definition) and by Gender: Based on Non-Union Sample 
Non-Europeans 
(Non-immigrants or immigrants who arrived before 1970s) 
Immigrants who arrived in the 1970s 
Immigrants who arrived in the 1980s 
Immigrants who arrived in the 1990s 
R2 
Foreign language at home 
N 
Output pay 
Men Women 
1 2 
-0.014 (-0.07) 0.369* (1.90) 
0.216 (0.64) 
-0.136 (-0.48) 
-0.150 (-0.52) 
-0.226 (-0.71) 
-0.332 (-0.81) 
-0.004 (-0.01) 
0.257 (0.90) 0.135 (0.44) 
638 468 
0.112 0.160 
Time rates 
Men Women 
3 4 
-0.057** (-2.79) 
-0.011 (-0.52) 
0.064** (2.30) 
-0.022 (-0.84) 
-0.009 (-0.29) 
-0.047 (-1.49) 
-0.038 (-1.13) 
-0.148*** (-4.01) 
-0.018 (-0.69) 0.009 (0.34) 
8,323 6,877 
0.363 0.315 
Notes: Models have included occupations (six categories), and all other explanatory variables shown in Table 2. Absolute values of t-statistics based on robust 
standard errors are in parentheses. 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Thus, the earlier result in the literature that performance pay is associated 
with reducing the ethnic wage differential to near zero even as it remains 
negative in the time rate sector does not apply to women. Even the time-rate 
differential for women appears to be near zero. The difference between time 
rates and performance pay does appear to apply to men in our early esti-
mates. Minority men suffer double-digit earnings differentials in the time rate 
sector that accounting for language and immigration reduce but do not 
eliminate. They suffer no significant earnings differential in the output pay 
sector. Yet when we examine the narrow sample designed to limit ourselves 
to the broad occupations in which choices between time rate and perfor-
mance pay seem more likely, a different pattern emerges. The significant 
negative differential faced by minority men in the time rate sector is elimi-
nated by the inclusion of language and immigration controls. This confirms 
the suspected role played by these variables and suggests that the high 
correlation between immigration, language and minority status must be 
accounted for when estimating ethnic. wage differences. 
Final version accepted on 12 February 2009. 
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Notes 
1. As an illustration, the automotive products marketing firm Ashland Canada Ltd. 
dismissed a commissioned sales worker for 'poor performance' but was forced to 
make restitution and pay a fine when it was revealed that the employee routinely 
exceeded the company set sales goals (Dessler et al. 2005). 
2. The authors emphasize that between their examination and the earlier examination 
by Bronars and Moore (1995), the NLSY cohort had aged, and that high-ability 
non-whites (as measured by AFQT scores) became increasingly concentrated in the 
output pay sector. Moreover, they replicate the Bronars and Moore findings using 
the earlier data, but the exact model applied to the later data, suggesting that the 
change in results reflects a change in the labour market, not in modelling. 
3. There are relatively few immigrants prior to 1970, and we varied their treatment 
with no substantive change in results. We excluded them from the estimations, put 
them in a residual category of 'other immigrants', and simply included them in 
the base. The estimations shown reflect the last treatment, but we emphasize that 
the choice is immaterial. 
4. About 9.1 per cent of workers in the first three occupational groups report 
output pay, while only 4.7 per cent of workers in the latter three occupations 
report output pay. Interestingly, within the latter three occupations, those 
reporting output pay are concentrated among managers. This seems the least 
comparable occupational group, as managers directly monitor the performance 
of other workers and are typically removed from a suitable individual measure of 
productivity. What they identify as output pay may more nearly resemble execu-
tive compensation. 
5. By limiting ourselves to these occupations, we examine a set of workers who are 
likely to actually face a choice of whether or not to work for an employer with 
output pay. Second, we reduce the unmeasured differences in workers and jobs 
that could drive spurious results, as earnings regimes (beyond occupation shift 
parameters) may differ across broad occupational groups. Finally, we also reduce 
the risk that estimations undertaken on the full sample merely reflect occupational 
sorting. Thus, the occupational groups in which output pay is prevalent may 
simply have reduced earnings dispersion, including reduced ethnic wage differen-
tials. Thus, what we would attribute to output pay in the full sample could actually 
be attributable to unmeasured occupational differences. 
6. Indeed, the data maximum and minimum seem believable with the absolute small-
est wage being nearly four dollars an hour, and the highest just above 120 dollars 
an hour. 
7. All estimations are done in Stata 8 using the 'survey' commands and identifying 
the underlying establishments as the primary survey units. This automatically 
generates robust standard errors while the survey weights return consistent point 
estimates. 
8. To the extent that gender segregation reflects a desire for fle~ible jobs (Bender et al. 
2005), those women willing to trade off earnings for flexibility are more likely to be 
observed in the time rate sector. Thus, as a possibility, the output pay sector may 
disproportionately reflect women motivated by high earnings. 
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Appendix 
TABLE Al 
Weighted Means by Payment Scheme and Gender (Based on Non-Union Sample and the Broad Definition of Output Pay) 
Variable 
Hourly wage 
(Non-immigrants and immigrants who arrived before 1970s) 
Immigrants who arrived in the 1970s 
Immigrants who arrived in the 1980s 
Immigrants who arrived in the 1990s 
Non-Europeans 
Foreign language at home 
Age in years 
Married (1 if married, 0 otherwise) 
Years of education 
Dependent children 
Presence of young children 
Part time 
Supervision (supervision of other employees' work on a day-to-day basis) 
Member of a team (I if yes, 0 if no) 
Years of experience 
Job tenure in years 
Months of unemployment in the past five years 
Working at home (hours worked at home in a usual week) 
Training received (1 if yes, 0 if no) 
Workplace size (log of total establishment employment) 
Observations 
Output pay (men) 
24.30 (15.34) 
0.870 (0.336) 
0.039 (0.193) 
0.054 (0.227) 
0.037 (0.188) 
0.142 (0.350) 
0.076 (0.265) 
38.25 (10.39) 
0.639 (0.480) 
14.05 (2.50) 
0.463 (0.499) 
0.239 (0.427) 
0.061 (0.240) 
0.587 (0.492) 
0.648 (0.478) 
17.21 (10.42) 
8.29 (8.05) 
1.03 (3.60) 
2.51 (5.24) 
0.628 (0.483) 
3.99 (1.72) 
3,247 
Output pay (women) 
17.10 (10.52) 
0.864 (0.343) 
0.065 (0.247) 
0.037 (0.189) 
0.034 (0.180) 
0.130 (0.336) 
0.066 (0.249) 
37.34 (10.60) 
0.542 (0.498) 
13.84 (2.01) 
0.411 (0.492) 
0.166 (0.373) 
0.161 (0.368) 
0.380 (0.486) 
0.490 (0.500) 
14.44 (9.65) 
6.65 (6.73) 
1.15 (3.97) 
1.17 (3.49) 
0.580 (0.494) 
3.60 (1.70) 
2,360 
Time rate (men) Time rate (women) 
18.31 (10.68) 14.75 (8.95) 
0.854 (0.353) 0.876 (0.329) 
0.041 (0.199) 0.045 (0.207) 
0.049 (0.216) 0.040 (0.195) 
0.055 (0.228) 0.039 (0.194) 
0.153 (0.360) 0.137 (0.344) 
0.085 (0.278) 0.082 (0.274) 
39.55 (11.69) 39.04 (11.62) 
0.567 (0.496) 0.529 (0.499) 
13.48 (2.55) 13.66 (2.30) 
0.437 (0.496) 0.402 (0.490) 
0.206 (0.404) 0.159 (0.366) 
0.083 (0.276) 0.238 (0.426) 
0.492 (0.498) 0.331 (0.471) 
0.460 (0.498) 0.394 (0.489) 
17.46 (11.54) 14.31 (10.22) 
7.28 (7.85) 6.63 (6.71) 
1.47 (4.91) 1.40 (4.83) 
1.51 (4.38) 1.30 (3.91) 
0.476(0.499) 0.506 (0.500) 
3.60 (1.83) 3.53 (1.97) 
5,714 4,985 
Notes: Output pay includes piece rates, commissions, tips and bonuses. Also included are dummy variables identifying 6 occupations, 6 regions and 14 industries. 
Standard deviations of the means are in parentheses. 
